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FOREIGN
OFFICE

DEPT. EASTERN

TITLE: GENERAL: SOCIAL: REFUGEES:
PRESSURES ON ISRAEL

E18/22
File No.

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DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE	D	DATE
	MDaly	18/3					
	Mr. Daly	12/8					
	RA	20/8					
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E18/22

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18/2

24/9/68

14

RECEIVED
ARCHIVES No. 15
- 2 OCT 1968
E 18/22

MEMORANDUM

From *Memery, Amman.*

To *Mr. F. A. Moore*
Eastern Dept.

LAST PAPER

Previous correspondence and subject :

E. 2/18 of 16 September. - *Israel and the Refugees.*

Dear Moore,

A copy of this letter was received here with a compliment slip addressed to Channing Baghdad. We have assumed that a copy was intended for us here and that this was simply an error when enveloping, and that Baghdad have received our copy.

Yours ever,

A. Couchman (A. COUCHMAN)

Res.

Can you check that
copy went to Baghdad
✓

copy sent to Baghdad
4/10 ft

13

L.18/22)

FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

16 September, 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

9

Israel and the Refugees

I am sorry you have had to wait so long for any comments on your letter 2/1 of 14 August about your discussion with Comay.

2. Since you wrote, there has been a good deal of telegraphing about the refugee question and the subject has been given a good airing in our most recent round of talks with the Americans (Washington telegram No.2734). So far as Israel is concerned, I think I can summarise our present views as follows:

E18/30 (7)

- (a) it is not possible to isolate the actual conclusion and execution of a settlement of the refugee problem, as opposed to formulating ideas about it, from a general settlement of political issues;
- (b) all the same, the refugee issue is one which will require fuller participation by the international community, and therefore a good deal more preparatory work, than any other. It follows that there is much to be said for pressing ahead both in the international community, and with the parties, in formulating principles and in promoting the necessary social and economic research. In general, we should prefer Jarring to co-ordinate discussion, though we are prepared to encourage him either by putting our own ideas to him, or by discussing his. This need not, however, exclude our taking advantage of any suitable opportunity to encourage the Israelis to continue with the research and contingency planning which Comay outlined to you;
- (c) beyond that, our discussions of this subject with the Israelis might most helpfully concentrate on continuing to encourage a more forthcoming attitude to the "new refugees", through the extension of the

LAST PAPER

/Family...

His Excellency
Mr. R.M. Hadow, C.M.G.,
British Embassy,
Tel Aviv.

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Family Reunion scheme or by some entirely new programme, and on putting across the principle that, however much the choice may be weighted by offering generous compensation for choosing otherwise, the refugees should have a right to choose return to Israel if they so wish.

3. It was encouraging to reach of Comay's comments that the young refugees do not want to go back to the land. As you know, our view is that UNRWA's money is well spent when used for the kind of education and vocational training which enables refugees to stand on their own feet wherever they may go; as it would be easier to resettle refugees in cities throughout the Arab world rather than elsewhere, it is helpful that the young refugees are keen to become urban dwellers.

4. I take the point in paragraph 8 of your letter about the transformation of the land of Israel since the establishment of the state, and agree that it would not be practical for any large numbers of refugees to return there. However I do think it important that the Israelis should accept and to the greatest extent possible be persuaded to declare their acceptance, that a return of a proportion of the refugees would be an element in a solution. The value of this attitude would be mainly psychological, and would be related as suggested in paragraph 3 of our telegram No.1171 to you, to the Israelis' concern with the ultimate Arab attitude to Israel in the event of an overall settlement being reached.

E 2/48

copy attached between (8) & (9)

(A.R. Moore)

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No. E 18/22

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
Unclassified.

To:—

Letter to:

R. M. Hadow, Esq.,
Tel Aviv.

From

Mr. A. R. Moore

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARK

In Confidence

I am sorry you have had to wait so long for any comment on

Israel and the Refugees

Thank you for your letter 2/1 of 14 August [N.P.] 2. about your discussion with Comay. Since you wrote,

there has of course been a good deal of telegraphic exchange about the refugee question and the subject ~~whether~~ has been given a good airing in our there is any prospect of making progress with it.

most recent round of talks with the

I think that I can summarise our present thinking, reflected in views which ~~lies behind~~ the brief on refugee matters.

So far as Israel is concerned, I prepared for Sir Denis Allen's visit to Washington think I can summarise our present views this week which we are copying separately to you,

as follows:

(a) it is not possible to isolate the actual conclusion and execution of a settlement of the refugee problem, as opposed to formulating ideas about it, from a general settlement of political issues;

all the same, (b) the refugee issue is however one which will require fuller more detailed participation by the international community, and therefore a good deal more preparatory work, than any other.

It follows that there is There is therefore much to be said for pressing ahead both in the international community, and with the parties, in formulating principles on the basis of which a settlement ~~might~~ might be worked out, and in promoting the necessary social and economic research. In

/general,

Copied to:

Chanceries, Cairo,

Washington,

UKMIS, New York,

Jedda,

Kuwait,

Moscow,

Paris,

Baghdad,

Amman,

Beirut,

Consulate-General, Jerusalem.

Americans (Washington telegram No. 2734)

[See minute below]

Mr. Hadow
Mr. Alagh

Mr. Moore. I do not think we ought to send copies of our briefs to posts in the Middle East. This would be to invite a torrent of comment and questioning.

R.M. Evans

1379.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

showed
 general, we prefer Jarring to co-ordinate discussion with the parties, though we are prepared to encourage him either by putting our own ideas to him, or by discussing his. This need not, however, exclude our taking advantage of ~~bringing up~~ any suitable opportunity which may offer itself to encourage the Israelis to continue with their own research and contingency planning which Comay outlined to you;

(c) beyond that, our discussions of this subject with the Israelis might most helpfully concentrate on continuing to encourage a more forthcoming attitude to the "new refugees", through the extension of the Family Reunion scheme or by some entirely new programme, and on putting across the principle that, however much the choice may be weighted by offering generous compensation for choosing otherwise, the refugees should have a right to choose return to Israel if they so wish.

3. It was encouraging to read of Comay's comments that the young refugees do not want to go back to the land. As you know, our view is that UNRWA's money is well spent when used for the kind of education and vocational training which enables refugees to stand on their own feet wherever they may go; ~~and hence~~ as it would be easier to resettle refugees in cities throughout the Arab world rather than elsewhere, in waterless back of Sinai it is helpful good to know that the young refugees are 'city-bred' ~~to be~~ keen to become urban dwellers.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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4. I take the point in
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 However I do think it important
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 acceptance of that a return of
 a proportion of the refugees would be
 an element in a solution. The value
 of this attitude would be &
 mainly psychological, and would be
 related as suggested in para 3
 of our telegram on 11/71
 you to the I media concern
 with the ultimate ^(And) attitude to I need
 in the event of a small settlement
 being reached.

A.R.17.
26.9.

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BRIEF NO. 3

ARAB/ISRAEL: REFUGEES

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ARAB/ISRAEL: REFUGEES

BACKGROUND

Our own views

Our own ideas about ways of solving the refugee problem are set out fully at Appendix 'B' to Mr. Brown's despatch E2/49 of 3 January 1968 to Lord Caradon (attached).

Attitudes of the Arabs and the Israelis

2. There is some discrepancy between the reported remarks by the U.A.R. leaders at different times. We are not sure whether they link the passage of Israeli cargoes as well as Israeli ships through the Suez Canal to the final solution of the refugee problem, or whether cargoes would be permitted to pass once a scheme for dealing with the problem had been drawn up and agreed. Our assessment is that the second alternative is more likely to be the real position. On the Israeli side, we discussed the desirability of an Israeli initiative on the refugee question with Mr. Eban and others on a number of occasions during the spring. From these conversations, it appeared that a good deal of detailed work had been put in hand in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that

/Mr...

- 2 -

Mr. Eban himself was conscious of the diplomatic advantages which might be secured from a forthcoming gesture on this question. The recent Israeli replies to the questions put to her by the U.A.R. through Dr. Jarring do however confirm her willingness to contribute to compensation "in the context of an agreed peaceful settlement based on regional and international co-operation." Otherwise, all that has come of this professed willingness to tackle the problem has been an unrealistic proposal that a regional conference might be convened to deal with it.

Recent Discussions with the Americans

3. Instructions were sent to Washington on 15 August to discuss with the Americans the possibility of putting to Dr. Jarring ideas about the refugee question. It was agreed between Mr. Tomkins and Mr. Battle on 19 August that this would be worthwhile, but it was also agreed that steps should first be taken in New York to discover what work on the problem had been done in the U.N. Secretariat. Lord Caradon subsequently spoke to Mr. Bunche and U Thant. The latter said that two officials had been working on the details of the refugee problem under Dr. Jarring's direction and that detailed

/studies...

- 3 -

studies had now been completed. The only indication of the details we have so far received is in a U.S. report on one of Dr. Jarring's visits to Cairo. Dr. Jarring is reported to have said that he excluded the possibility of the U.A.R. taking any more refugees. Under his plan, considerable technical and financial assistance would have to be given to the receiving countries. He estimates that as much as \$1½ billion might be needed in all, of which \$500 million would be required during the first five years. Stressing that his views were necessarily preliminary, he thought that an overall solution would take about ten years.

4. In discussing the refugee question with Mr. Tomkins, Mr. Battle made the following points:

- (a) He thought he had detected rather less Egyptian emphasis recently on the need for a complete solution of the refugee problem as a condition for allowing the passage of Israeli flag vessels through the Suez Canal.
- (b) Any plan should be put forward by an international body or by Dr. Jarring; an Anglo-American label on any plan would be its kiss of death.

/(c)...

- 4 -

- (c) The U.S. Administration had tried to interest neutrals (such as the Swiss and Swedes) to come forward with proposals on the refugee problem, but had had no success. They had, however, encouraged private organisations possessing funds which could be made available for work on the subject.
- (d) The U.S. Administration had at present no overall plan for solving the problem; but they were confident that, in the context of a peace settlement, Congress would be generous in making funds available.

Private Studies and Schemes

5. There is some evidence that leading American Jews would be prepared to make large contributions towards the compensation of refugees as their contribution to a settlement enabling Israel to live in peace and stability. Among private Americans who have shown particular interest are Mr. David Rockefeller and Senator Javits. The most elaborate scheme (with which Senator Javits is associated) is sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is under the direction of Sir Eric Wyndham White. Sir Eric Wyndham White talked

/to...

- 5 -

to Mr. Roberts about the scheme early in July.

He spoke of three stages:

- (a) a budget of \$50,000 had already been allocated to allow economists to make a study of the material available;
- (b) if this study revealed that the project was worth pursuing, a budget of \$1.5 million would be allocated for a full-scale survey of the problem;
- (c) proposals in the survey would be put into effect.

Mr. Roberts confined himself to observing that we thought that the refugee problem was only susceptible of solution in the framework of the general settlement, and that ideas might most effectively be fed in through Dr. Jarring and the U.N. Secretariat. The United States Mission in New York commented that they thought that the project might already have become compromised in Arab eyes because of the presence among its sponsors of Senator Javits and Senator Edward Kennedy.

/Talking...

- 6 -

TALKING POINTS

Reasons for Tackling the Problem soon

We give a high priority to the search for an acceptable solution to the refugee problem for three reasons. First the degree of human suffering involved in the present situation is very great. Secondly, although a solution can probably be implemented only in the context of a general settlement, the complexity of the problem is such that it will take some time to work out a solution. Thirdly, the reopening of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping is linked by the Egyptians to the solution of the refugee problem; the Israelis for their part will not withdraw from the East Bank of the Canal in the absence of a guarantee of free passage to Israeli shipping; Israeli withdrawal, which is fundamental to the negotiation of a settlement, is therefore closely related to the refugee problem.

Ways of Helping Jarring

2. Since our people discussed the subject with yours on 19 August, Lord Caradon has spoken to Bunche and U Thant. It now seems that Jarring has prepared detailed proposals, which he is ready to put to both sides when he judges the moment suitable. But U Thant

/has...

- 7 -

has said that it would be helpful for permanent members of the Security Council to put ideas about implementing the Resolution to Jarring and Bunche has suggested that the permanent members might encourage Jarring to put forward practical proposals of his own, including particularly proposals for dealing with the refugee question. Ought we to do either or both of these things? Our view is that it might help Jarring, and would in any event do no harm, to speak separately to him on both points, with the proviso that it must remain up to him to judge when the moment was ripe for putting detailed proposals to the parties.

Costs and Contributions

3. You have told us that Jarring estimates that the cost of a settlement might be as much as \$1½ billion over ten years, of which \$500 million would be required in the first five years. We wonder how your own estimates compare with these and whether you have had a shot at dividing the estimated costs between private sources and the international community? Our preliminary calculation is that about 1.2 million "old" refugees would be involved. Do you agree?

Attitudes of the Arabs and the Israelis

4. We should welcome your views about U.A.R. and Israeli attitudes to the refugee question. Do you

/think...

- 8 -

think that any serious work on a possible comprehensive solution has been done in Cairo or Tel Aviv? And do you share our view that the recent Israeli proposal for calling a conference on the subject is quite unrealistic in present circumstances?

Our views about a solution

5. We think it essential that any plan should recognise to the greatest extent possible the injustices suffered by the refugees (at the hands of history if not of the Israelis), since this would go a long way to make any plan more acceptable to the Arabs. It also seems to us essential that, however much the choice is weighted by the offer of generous compensation, the refugees should be given the option of returning to Israel. We wonder whether you agree. We also wonder whether you have any estimates of how many refugees might wish to return. An Egyptian view at the beginning of the year was that substantially less than half a million would wish to do so. We are inclined to think that, if generous compensation was offered, the number would be very much smaller than half a million.

6. All the remaining refugees would have to be resettled elsewhere in the Arab world, or perhaps further afield.

We understand that Jarring has been giving some thought to

/this...

- 9 -

this problem. In any event, major contributions to the resettlement and compensation costs would clearly be required both from Israel and from other members of the international community. It is also our view that a new U.N. office (perhaps associated with that of the High Commission for Refugees) would be needed to co-ordinate and supervise action under an agreed plan; valiant though its works has been, U.N.R.W.A. is associated with bad times and emergency measures by all concerned.

7. We have been giving some thought to where such a plan or programme might fit into an overall settlement. One possibility is that the publication of an agreed plan might coincide with the beginning of Israeli withdrawal and the beginning of clearance operations in the Suez Canal. As a second step, the endorsement of the plan by the United Nations and the beginning of formal action to put it into effect might coincide with the completion of Israeli withdrawal, and the reopening of the Canal to ships of all flags.

8. We should also welcome your views on the role which might be played by private bodies with funds and expertise at their disposal, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. We feel that bodies

/of...

- 10 -

of this kind should so far as possible be encouraged to associate themselves with the United Nations and with Dr. Jarring's work rather than with Governments. There is otherwise a danger that one party or other might refuse to co-operate - because it suspected bias in the approach of the body concerned.

9. We have also thought about what might be done if Jarring failed. We have come to the tentative conclusion that the scope for useful action would be very limited. We could keep closely in touch with U Thant and the U.N. Secretariat. We could also continue discreetly to encourage the research and survey work of private bodies active in the field. But, in our view, the unpalatable truth is that there would be little prospect of making progress towards a solution of the refugee problem in the absence of any movement towards a general political settlement.



With the compliments of
F 18/22
HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY
(Chancery)

Eastern Dept.,
F.O.

18 September, 1968.

TEL-AVIV

Ref: Our letter (4/5) of 27 Aug.

per [unclear] 1/6

E 18/22

12

PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF A NEW WAR

1. The Government of Israel has repeatedly declared its desire for a negotiated peace and for secure borders; it has likewise indicated that it has no intention of conquering territories. **The achievement of a peace agreement and the security of our country have been and remain the supreme aim of our State and are of vital importance for the whole region. Action must be taken in order to prevent the outbreak of a new war.**
2. We note with concern and regret that readiness to enter upon negotiations with a view to an agreed peace has not as yet been expressed either by any government of a neighbouring Arab State or by any recognized Arab public body. Accordingly, aggressive actions on the part of both Arab governments and terrorist organizations under their aegis, aided and abetted by certain international factors, have increased of late to such an extent as to make a new war in this region possible.
3. No territories should be evacuated without a peace agreement ensuring our peace and security. **At the same time we call upon the government of Israel to strive continuously and constructively to present to the world the fundamental principles for a peace agreement in this part of the world.**

We call upon the public to support the following demands put forward by us as general principles and guide-lines towards a peace agreement, which were drawn up at a public meeting of our members and sympathizers.

- ★ The government should once more declare unambiguously that Israel is not seeking territorial aggrandizement but that it continues to adhere, now as in the past, to the principle that occupied areas should be evacuated following upon a peace compact based on secure and agreed-upon borders, as expressed in the statement made by Israel's representative at the United Nations, in connection with our acceptance of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.
- ★ The government should take immediate action to put an end to Jewish civilian settlement in the areas in question aimed at creating new facts in the occupied areas. The government should also refrain from expropriating lands for this purpose.
- ★ The government should make public a plan for the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees. This plan should be part and parcel of a peace settlement, and immediate steps should be taken for its initial implementation. Any action likely to increase the number of refugees should be avoided.
- ★ The government should co-opt the Arab residents of the occupied territories as a factor in, and party to, the general effort to attain peace.

Whatever the difficulties and obstacles raised by the Arab states and their supporters throughout the world, **ISRAEL SHOULD NOT RELAX HER POLITICAL INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PEACE, NOR SHOULD ANYTHING BE DONE TO IMPEDE A PEACE SETTLEMENT.**

FOR—PEACE AND SECURITY; AGAINST ANNEXATION

Secretariat
of
The Council
for the
Tel Aviv Area

The Student Committee for
Security through Peace, at
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv University.

Please address statements of support and contributions to P.O.B. 29244, Tel Aviv



by
11

(18/2)
(4/5)

UNCLASSIFIED

BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEL AVIV.

27 August, 1968.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No 15
-4 SEP 1968
E18/22

Dear Department,

Arab Refugees

12

--- We enclose a translation of a paid advertisement which appeared in Ha'aretz on Thursday, 22 August and which was clearly inspired by Mr. Eshkol's remarks reported in our telegram No. 1009 (not to all). As you will see, the Government are asked to take the initiative in trying to solve the Arab refugee problem.

2. We do not know anything about the signatories ("The Student Committee for Security Through Peace") but we shall of course keep our ears and eyes open. At first sight the group looks like yet another of the several which have come into being since the Six Day War, usually taking a stand for or against the retention of the occupied territories (see correspondence resting at Mandel's letter (4/5) of 4 July - not to all). At any rate they are acting in the same tradition by making their appearance on the scene through a manifesto published in the press.

E18/22

E18/19.

Yours ever,

non.

CHANCERY

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

c.c. Chanceries: Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo,
Moscow, Paris, Washington.

UKMis. New York,

" Geneva,

H.M. Consulate General, Jerusalem.

Handwritten signature



Ha'aretz (22.8.1968)

WE DISASSOCIATE OURSELVES FROM THE "TIME BOMB"

For twenty years the refugee question has constituted an obstacle on the way to peace between ourselves and the Arabs. It is one of the problems which aggravate the conflict and hatred in our area.

Eshkol's declaration rejecting a solution of the refugee problem on our own initiative here and immediately is a political and moral failure.

The traditional claim of Israel that she cannot absorb more Arabs is a piece of deception in the present circumstances. In the Occupied Territories there are about one million Arabs and most of the refugees are among them.

A discontented refugee in the Occupied Territories or elsewhere is liable to become a terrorist.

Only the settlement of the refugees and not their eviction or leaving them in camps can help to dismantle the "time bomb" presently in our midst.

Jewish and international groups have already indicated their willingness to take part in the expenses connected with the settlement of refugees.

The settlement of the refugees will constitute a partial settlement to the human problem which all the peoples of the area caused and the complete settlement of which depends on achieving peace that will lead to the realisation of political rights of refugees as they see them.

The settlement of refugees and indeed their settlement before solving the problem of the Occupied Territories and before achieving a general peace settlement will take the wind out of the sails of Arab propagandists and contribute to the improvement of relations between the peoples of the area.

Even though there is no doubt that Eshkol's declaration does not express the opinion of the whole Knesset and even more so the opinion of the general public in Israel, no broad and sharp opposition to his words has yet been heard.

We appeal to the public to protest against Eshkol's declaration and to his colleagues to disassociate themselves from it.

Student Committee for Security through Peace
P.O.B. 6209, Jerusalem

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RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No 1
- 3 SEP 1968
E 18/22



① Mr. Alison
② Mr. George
③ E. E. Key
BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL,
JERUSALEM.

(1821/68)

22 August, 1968.

Brace Brucly frank.

Dear Tony

Israel and the Refugees.

R.E.
28/8

I was interested in paragraph 5 of Michael Hadow's letter 2/1 of 14 August about refugees.

2. I think it is true that many Arabs, especially the younger generation, are no longer interested in coming back. This point was made to me in a conversation I had recently with Hakmet el Masri (Jordanian Personalities No. 53), who said that if the Arabs were now given a free choice of compensation or return to ^{their} homelands in Israel no more than 50,000 would want to go back. He regretted that the Israelis did not seem to realise this and adapt their policy on the refugee problem accordingly. Unfortunately, I see little sign of this happening and my impression is that the majority of Israelis are quite indifferent to the fate of the refugees. I think this fundamental attitude is typified in a remark made by Louis Pincus, Chairman of the Jewish Agency and Director of Immigration, in a discussion on the refugee question with a mutual acquaintance who retailed it to me in rather shocked tones: "We don't want the buggers back". I am, therefore, sure that Michael's conclusions in paragraph 8 are correct and that his recommendations in paragraph 10 are right and this is the most we can do.

Yours ever,

TEL

(E. E. Key)

18/8/68

A. R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

c.c. R. M. Hadow, Esq., C.M.G., Tel Aviv.
P. G. D. Adams, Esq., C.M.G., Amman.
Chancery, Washington.
Chancery, New York.

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9

RECEIVED IN
ARC
22 AUG 1968
E18/22



BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV,

14 August, 1968.

(2/1)

① Mike Comay. Any obs?
② Enter.

Dear Tony,

Israel and the Refugees

E2/48 R.E. 19/18
copy att

Please refer to your telegram Number 1171 of 1 August.

2. I saw Mike Comay on 8 August and spoke to him as instructed in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference. I also referred to the Israel Prime Minister's statement on the refugee problem reported in my telegram Number 1009 and said that this seemed a very disappointing line.

3. As I feared would be the case, Comay was quite negative on the idea of putting anything to the Arabs through Jarring. He said that the Americans had tried much the same tack some time ago but had dropped it. Basically the Israel position remains that the solution of the refugee problem is inextricably tied up with the final settlement. Only then will boundaries, resources to meet the problem, and other factors all of which will affect the outcome, become clear. Nor do the Israelis accept that the offer of compensation would necessarily be accepted at this stage by a majority of the refugees against their right to return to Israel. Comay admitted, however, that provided that there were attractive alternatives for settlement in Arab countries or elsewhere which had already been put to the refugees, there was then something in the argument that, given these alternatives plus recompense for what they had lost in Israel, the great bulk of refugees would not opt for return.

4. For the time being, all the Israel Government could do (as a "recipient" country for the first time) was to co-operate fully with UNWRA and to put as much money as they could into alleviating the lot of all Arabs in the Occupied Territories. He was not in favour of pilot schemes for resettling some of the refugees in territories now under Israel control. No doubt some useful propaganda could be extracted from such operations, but they would really be a "lot of eye-wash" and would only scratch at the basic problem. As we knew, the Israel Government had carried

A.R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G., 2 Apr.
FOREIGN OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

per memo

copy JRO
Planning Staff
sent 3/10/68

to NEAD } /out
UN dim } a/c
2/3 }
no to Arts

4/1



out extensive surveys on the West Bank to try and assess its economic and absorptive potential. From these it was clear that there was very little spare cultivable land on the West Bank which had any relevance in the light of the size of the refugee problem. It really boiled down to a strip along the Jordan Valley. The area between El Arish and Gaza had also been spoken of as a possible site for agricultural development ever since the beginning of the century. There was no doubt that here and in the Negev and Sinai there was land and to spare - but the water problem was almost insuperable. He added that even on the West Bank the problem of water for any additional agricultural settlement was very difficult and would ultimately have to entail agreements with Jordan or the Lebanon for an additional allotment of water supplies.

5. One interesting point Comay made, which I think is valid and which we might bear in mind, is that the Israelis, as a result of their closer connection with refugees since the war, assess that the bulk of the younger generation have no desire to go back to the land. Whatever their fathers may have been, as a result of educational processes under UNWRA in the last twenty years, the great majority now look to industry and urban employment as their outlet. He said he had found hardly any of the younger refugees who did not want to be schoolmasters, mechanics, bus or lorry drivers, shop-keepers or even waiters and hoteliers. In short, "the drift to the city" applied to the refugees just as it did to anyone else in the modern world.

6. With regard to the final settlement Comay was not so negative on the possibility of absorption of some refugees into Israel, as the Prime Minister's remarks would themselves suggest. The way he put it was that, e.g. if Gaza were incorporated in Israel in the final settlement, then its population including the refugees would become Israel's problem and Israel would have to cope with it. Similarly, of course, any areas on the West Bank which were incorporated in Israel and contained Arab populations would become Israel's responsibility.

/7. I



- 3 -

7. I also put it to Comay that in the event of no settlement being foreseeable in the near future, the Israelis would be well advised to consider having back from Jordan at least those former refugees who had left the West Bank. I advanced the usual arguments and was surprised to find that Comay, although he was pretty careful, seemed to think that something a good deal more all-embracing than the present Family Re-union and Hardship Schemes would have to be undertaken within the next year.

8. I myself do not think we are going to get very far with the Israelis if we talk to them at this stage about the acceptance back into Israel proper (as it was before the June War) of the Arabs who left in 1948/49. It is unfortunately quite obvious to any outside observer who spends any time here that their lands in the country or their homes and businesses in the cities are just not there any more. The clock has moved very fast in the last twenty years and it is quite impossible to put it back. In addition there is the problem of the demographic question. At this stage Israel's fears of the swamping of the "Jewishness" of Israel by fast-breeding Arabs are ones we wish to encourage as an argument against the retention of the territories conquered in the June War.

9. This is not to say that, at a later stage if some sort of settlement is in sight and if the Israelis see that the acceptance of another one or two hundred thousand Arabs into Israel proper is the price of permanent peace, we should not then be able to press the Israelis to accept, with greater prospects of success.

10. Meanwhile, I would have thought we would be better advised to concentrate on:-

- (a) urging the Israelis to treat well and spend money on all the Arabs including the refugees, who are now in their control;
- (b) keeping on at them about the acceptance back of all those refugees now on the East Bank who would be prepared to return.

11. I am sending copies of this letter to all the recipients of your telegram Number 1171.

Yours ever
Michael Hadow

(Michael Hadow)

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CYBER/CAT A AND BY BAG
PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE
TEL NO 1171

TO TEL AVIV
1 AUGUST 1968 (E)

off

E2/48

copy on E2/57

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 1171 OF 1 AUGUST AND TO CAIRO REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND UKHIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO JEDDA, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, PARIS, BAGHDAD, AMMAN AND BEIRUT JERUSALEM.

CAIRO TELEGRAM NO. 747 TO F.O., PARAGRAPH 2: JARRING MISSION.

HASSAN SABRI'S COMMENT ON THE ISRAELI QUESTIONS, WHILE NOT GOING VERY FAR, WAS NOT ENTIRELY DISCOURAGING. ACCORDING TO THE AMERICANS HERE THE U.A.R. EMBASSY IN LONDON, WHO ARE AWARE OF THE ISRAELI ENQUIRIES, HAVE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WILL CERTAINLY HAVE QUESTIONS OF THEIR OWN TO PUT, IN PARTICULAR AS TO WHAT THE ISRAELI DEFINITION OF SECURE BOUNDARIES IS.

2. WE THINK THE AMERICANS ARE RIGHT TO TRY AND BUILD FROM THE ISRAELI QUESTIONS. ANYTHING THAT H.M. AMBASSADOR CAIRO CAN DO TO ENCOURAGE THE EGYPTIANS TO REPLY ON THE SAME PLANE AS THE QUESTIONS, AS HASSAN SABRI IN EFFECT DID, THOUGH IF POSSIBLE MORE POSITIVELY, RATHER THAN IN THE DEBATING MANNER FORESHADOWED BY THE EGYPTIANS HERE, WOULD BE VALUABLE.

3. EQUALLY IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF H.M. AMBASSADOR TEL AVIV COULD BRING HOME TO THE ISRAELIS THAT ANY CHANGE OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS NORMAL RELATIONS AFTER A SETTLEMENT WILL NEED CAREFUL CULTIVATION BY THEM. FOR EXAMPLE IT WOULD BE A NATURAL ARAB REACTION TO SAY THAT ANY SUCH FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE AS THE ISRAELIS ARE LOOKING FOR MUST DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE QUOTE JUST SOLUTION UNQUOTE OF THE REFUGEE^E PROBLEM CALLED FOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, AND ON THE ISRAELI CONTRIBUTION TO THIS. THE ARABS' HOSTILITY TO ISRAEL DERIVES MUCH OF ITS STRENGTH AND BITTERNESS FROM THEIR SENSE OF THE INJUSTICE DONE TO

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-2-

THE REFUGEES. IF THE ISRAELIS WANT TO NURTURE A CHANGE OF HEART AMONG THE ARABS THEY WOULD DO WELL TO TAKE THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. ONE COURSE WOULD BE FOR THEM TO LET IT BE KNOWN THROUGH JARRING THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED AS PART OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT TO SUBSCRIBE TO A SOLUTION WHICH DEALT NOT ONLY WITH RESETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES OUTSIDE ISRAEL BUT WHICH ALSO CONTAINED AN ISRAELI RECOGNITION THAT THE REFUGEES HAD SUFFERED AN INJUSTICE, AND PROVIDED TO THE GREATEST DEGREE POSSIBLE, FOR THE EXERCISE BY THE REFUGEES OF A RIGHT TO RETURN TO ISRAEL. IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT IF THE ALTERNATIVE WAS GENEROUS COMPENSATION FEW REFUGEES WOULD ELECT TO RETURN TO ISRAEL. WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANYTHING THAT H.M. AMBASSADOR TEL AVIV CAN LEARN OF ISRAELI THINKING ABOUT A SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE^E PROBLEM.

^

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8

FOREIGN OFFICE,

S.W.1.

19 August, 1968.

18/22)

7

We were interested to note the evidence in your telegram No. 1009 of 8 August for the existence of a body of support in the Knesset for the adoption of a more forthcoming position by Israel on the refugee question. As you are aware, the possibility of action on this question is under constant review both here and in New York. I have no doubt it is something which is in your minds also, but we would welcome a comment on the significance of this development, so that we shall be in the position to assess any suggestions which may be made for further action either in New York or in the form of further representations on this question to the Israelis.

(R. J. Alston)
Eastern Department

M. Mandel, Esq.,
Tel Aviv.

Copy to:

S. Egerton, Esq.,
U.K. Mission to the U.N.,
New York.

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DRAFT

LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
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Unclassified.

To:—

M. Mandel, Esq.,
Tel Aviv.

From

R. J. Alston
Telephone No. & Ext.
EASTERN
Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

Copy to:

S. Egerton, Esq.,
U.K. Mission
to the U.N.,
New York.

We were interested to note the evidence in your telegram No. 1009 of 8 August ^{for the} ~~of~~ ^{existence of a body} ~~a volume~~ of support in the Knesset for the adoption of a more forthcoming position by Israel on the refugee question. As you are aware, the possibilities ^{on} of ~~any~~ action ~~to~~ ^{on} ~~alleviate~~ this ^{question} ~~problem~~ is under constant review both here and in New York. I have no doubt it is something which is ~~constantly~~ in your minds also, but we would welcome a comment on the significance of this development ~~in the not too distant future~~, so that we shall be in the position to assess any suggestions ^{which may be made} ~~for~~ further action ~~on our part~~ either in New York or in the form ^{of} ~~of~~ further representations ^{as per} ~~to the Israelis~~ ^{on this question to the Israelis.}

*Ray
15/8*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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EN CLAIR

TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 1009

8 AUGUST 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDSD FO TELNO 1009 OF 3 AUG RFI TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGDAD, CAIRO, MOSCOW, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK, UKMIS GENEVA.

ARAB REFUGEES.

IN PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY, THE PRIME MINISTER CRITICISED PROPOSALS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD INITIATE MODEL ARAB REFUGEE SETTLEMENT PROJECTS BECAUSE HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED IN ISRAEL OR BY ISRAEL.

2. THE PROBLEM HAD TO BESOLVED, AND COULD ONLY BE SOLVED, REGIONALLY, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE AVAILABLE LAND, WATER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES INCLUDING OIL ROYALTIES. RESETTLEMENT RESOURCES WERE SURE TO BE AVAILADLE INTERNATIONALLY. IF REFUGEES WERE TO BE SETTLED INSIDE ISRAEL IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO CREATING A TIME-BOMB LIKE THE ONE THAT WAS TICKING AWAY IN CYPRUS WITH ITS 22 PERCENT NON-GREEK POPULATION .

3. TAKING CARE NOT TO COMMIT HIMSELF MR. ESHKOL HINTED THAT WHILE THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE WEST BANK COULD BE SORTED OUT LOCALLY, THE SAME WAS NOT SO FOR GAZA.

4. COMMENTING , MR. SHLOMO ROSEN (MAPAM) SAID THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM HAD BEEN USED BY THE ARAB STATES AS APOISONOUS WEAPON IN THEIR POLITICAL GAME. ISRAEL SHOULD MAKE A START AT SOLVING IT BECAUSE THE REFUGEE CAMPS WERE A BREEDING GROUND FOR TERRORISM. MR. MOSHE UNNA (NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY) SAID THAT SINCE ALARGE NUMBER OF ARAB REFUGEES HAD COME UNDER ISRAEL'S CONTROL , THE FEELING THAT THEY WERE NOT ISRAEL'S BUSINESS WAS NOT SO STRONG AS BEFORE.

/ISRAEL'S

Mr. Rosen
Mapam

Halim
Handel
8/18

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ISRAEL'S FRIENDS EXPECTED HER TO MAKE SOME SIGN THAT SHE TOOK THE PROBLEM SERIOUSLY.

ALTHOUGH SHE COULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM ON HER OWN, SHE COULD SET IN MOTION WHEELS WHICH NO-ONE HAD TURNED BEFORE. MR. MOSHE EREM (LABOUR) ARGUED THAT VERY PENNY SPENT ON REFUGEE REHABILITATION WAS WORTH TWO IN TERMS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

MR. GIDEON HAUSNER (INDEPENDENT LABOUR PARTY) THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN CORRECT TO WAIT SOME TIME IN ORDER TO SEE WHICH REFUGEES WANTED TO REMAIN IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ISRAEL HAD NOT PREVENTED THOSE WHO WANTED TO LEAVE FROM SO DOING, BUT THIS EXODUS WOULD NOT SOLVE THE WHOLE PROBLEM. ISRAEL HAD TO CONCERN HERSELF AT LEAST ABOUT THE BEGINNING OF A SOLUTION FOR THOSE REFUGEES WHO REMAIN.

5. THE REFUGEE QUESTION WAS THEN REFERRED TO A PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE

MR. HADOW

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PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 316

8 March 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 316 of 8 March. Repeated for information to Washington, Amman, Cairo, U.K. Mission New York and Saving to Jerusalem and Beirut.

Your telegrams Nos. 361 and 362: Situation in Jordan.

These arrived after despatch of my telegrams Nos. 307 and 308.

2. In the circumstances, I think it would be best if I were to see Rafael in Jerusalem early next week and see how far the Israelis have got with their homework, before I raise additional points of criticism.

3. In speaking to Musiseban, as reported in my telegram No. 260, I had stressed the point made in your message that it was all the unprocessed applications which we wished to see approved. I have consistently taken the line over the last four months that as long as there are between 120 thousand and 150 thousand refugees who say they wish to return, the Israelis can make no impact by playing around with "family reunion schemes" and other fringe solutions. I imagine that Mr. Eban's idea of the 6,000 applications is based on his estimate of the very furthest he can get his Cabinet colleagues to agree. I shall therefore argue that in the circumstances the Foreign Ministry should go for a maximum target rather than a minimum one since any proposals may get whittled down in Cabinet.

4. For the record, Lourie has been out of the country for some time on a tour of the United States and Asia and the conversation reported in Washington telegram No. 747 was in fact, between Barbour and Rafael.

Foreign Office pass to Washington 89, Cairo 80, U.K. Mission New York 93 and Saving to Beirut 23.

Mr. Hadow

[Repeated as requested]

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PRIORITY AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 185 8 March 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 185 of 8 March
Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Washington, UKMis New York,
Jerusalem, Beirut and Cairo

Your telegram No. 361 to Tel Aviv.

Situation in Jordan.

Any gestures from Israel on either refugees or Jerusalem,
more forthcoming than those so far made, would of course
strengthen King Hussein's position as he moves towards
negotiations under Jarring's auspices. To that extent they
would be most welcome.

2. We should not however underrate the chances of a sub-
stantial number of the refugees themselves refusing to return
to a West Bank still under Israeli occupation. Despite the
large body of Jordanians who are eager for peace and a quiet
life (reference my despatch No. 1/2 of 4 March) which we
believe includes a large number of refugees as well as West
Bank Jordanians, there is understandably much reluctance, to
put it no higher than that, on the part of many people to
return to their homes or camps on the West Bank while present
conditions prevail. The activities of the Fatah and the chain
reaction of incidents and reprisals are not conducive to those
longing for a quiet life placing themselves in the sort of
environment obtaining on the West Bank today.

3. If the Israelis were to make the sort of wide and generous
gesture envisaged in your telegram under reference, it is not
impossible therefore that there would be a disappointing response
from Jordan. This could surely only be a further triumph for
Israeli extremists and a serious reverse for Jordan. World
opinion could fairly easily be persuaded by Israel into thinking
the Arabs unreasonable should they refuse to accept such an
Israeli offer at this stage.

4. On the other hand, if Israel wishes to do something about
"the problem in Jordan" she could stop her current campaign of
"encouraging" Gaza refugees from leaving the area for Jordan.
As many as 600 a day are reported to have been crossing lately.

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- 2 -

Any public statement on Jerusalem, backed by the visible suspension of work there, about the expropriation of the land in East Jerusalem would also of course help King Hussein demonstrate that his policy of restraint was worth supporting.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Washington 48, UKMis New York 40 and Routine to Jerusalem 57, Beirut 98 and Cairo 37.

Mr. Adams

[Repeated as requested]

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PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 308 7 March 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 308 of 7 March
Repeated for information to:

Washington, Amman, Cairo, and
U.K. Mission New York,
and Saving to Jerusalem.

③ My immediately preceding telegram: Middle East.

From this and other snippets in the conversation I would deduce
that what happened at the Cabinet was:-

EJ1/20 (a) Eban farked raising the refugee issue for the reasons
given in my telegram No. 247.

copy on ETI/5 (b) He spoke strongly about uncoordinated and harmful
initiatives in Jerusalem, fortified by the recent mess into
which the Israelis got themselves as reported in paragraphs
5 and 6 of my telegram No. 286.

copy (c) But the bulk of the argument was about the handling of the
Jarring Mission in future. Rafael said that, unfortunately,
every member of the Cabinet considered himself an expert drafts-
man and much time was wasted in drafting in Cabinet the actual
formulae which Mr. Eban had put up to Jarring. Mr. Eban is obviously
struggling to get the Cabinet to give him certain broad guide
lines and to leave the precise technical drafting to him and his
Advisers in the Foreign Ministry.

F.O. pass Washington 88, Cairo 79, and U.K. Mission New York [gp
undec]

Mr. Hadow

[Repeated as requested]

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PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 307

7 March 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 307 of 7 March. Repeated for information to Washington, Amman, Cairo and U.K. Mission New York and Saving to Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 260: Middle East.

Rafael, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approached me last night at Ghana National Day party and said he realised I was awaiting some answers. He would like me to know that with regard to building operations in the appropriated site in East Jerusalem, Mr. Eban thought he could shortly produce some reassuring words which could be conveyed to the Jordanians. The whole project was still in the planning stage as he had told me when I had raised the same subject with him (my telegram No. 246) and it was unfortunate that there was so much wild talk by interested parties in Israel which appeared in the Press.

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enter
E74/2

2. With regard to refugees the Foreign Ministry were also working on "something" but this might take a week or ten days. When I asked him whether Mr. Eban had in fact raised the problem at Tuesday's Cabinet, he said that there had not been time. I expressed the hope that the "something" being thought of in the Foreign Ministry would be something substantial and asked Rafael whether he thought Mr. Eban could get it through the Cabinet. Rafael dodged this question.

3. See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office pass to Washington 87, Cairo 78 and U.K. Mission New York 91.

Mr. Hadow

[Repeated as requested]

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PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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E2/50

Telno 294 5 March, 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.294 of 5 March, Repeated for information to Washington, Amman, and UKMIS New York.

Washington telegram No.764: Middle East.

My American colleague saw Eban in Jerusalem yesterday and this morning showed me his reporting telegram.

ET1/20 copy attd

2. He had strongly supported all our arguments with regard to refugees (my telegram No.260) and had further urged Eban to prevent further unilateral actions in Jerusalem which could cloud the issue.

3. He did not speak on the lines of paragraph 2 (iii) of Washington telegram under reference.

4. He said that Eban had told him that there was to be an extraordinary Cabinet today to deal with several items of unfinished business. At this he would once again raise the refugee question and see what sort of offer Israel could make. With regard to unilateral actions in Jerusalem he hoped that administrative delays could ensure that there was no actual building in the appropriated band for some time to come. He also spoke fairly freely about the lack of co-ordination which had led to the muddle about the recent decrees regarding crossings to the West Bank and over the Allenby Bridge (my telegram No.286).

ET1/5 c/attd

5. Barbour has no instructions and therefore did not again raise the question of Israel's acceptance of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November (my telegram No.261).

c. attd ET1/20 E2/57 c. attd

6. I am not necessarily optimistic, for the reasons given in my telegram No.247, that Eban will get anywhere in Cabinet on the question of refugees, but it is at least encouraging that our representations and those now made by the Americans have given him a further chance to raise this hitherto forbidden subject. He should be more successful over the question of unilateral acts in Jerusalem, since the recent muddle has revealed very clearly to the Government that lack of co-ordination can bring about unforeseen and incommensurate troubles with international and United Nations opinion. But even here past experience makes one apprehensive that building could suddenly start one day on the authority of some minor official in one of the numerous Ministries who all seem to have a finger in the pie.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 85 and UKMIS New York 88.

Mr. Hadow.

[Repeated as requested]

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E2/57.

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 261

28 February, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 261 of 28 February, Repeated for information to Amman, Cairo, UK Mission New York and Washington and Saving to Beirut.

Your telegram No. 827 to UK Mission New York:

Jarring Mission.

At the end of conversation reported in my telegram No. 260, I asked Mr. Eban how his talks had gone with Mr. Jarring yesterday.

2. He said that Mr. Jarring now felt that the time for progress had come, despite the unresolved battle of semantics between the Israel acceptance of "agreement" on the Resolution and the Egyptian insistence on "implementation" - a word he hoped Lord Caradon would remember from his conversations last November had been specifically excluded from the Resolution. Jarring would now go to New York to see how much support he could get from the Secretary General if he were now to convene the parties in Cyprus.

3. I said that unfortunately your impression was that Israel's failure to give the Egyptians an unequivocal acceptance of the Resolution might give them an excuse for refusing to attend. Had not the Israelis better prepare to offer such unequivocal acceptance if this was all that was needed to bring the Egyptians to the negotiating table.

4. Mr. Eban said that he did not understand. Of course Israel accepted the Resolution as it stood, were prepared to reach agreement on all its elements and would faithfully implement any such agreement reached. But they were not going to fall into the Egyptian trap of insistence on implementation without any negotiation or agreement on what was to be done. As authors of the Resolution we must surely support the Israel view that it was a Resolution under Chapter 6 of the Charter and not Chapter 7 as the Egyptians were trying to make it. He saw the Egyptian dilemma. On the one hand they wanted their territory back, but on the other they were bound by the Khartoum Resolution of "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel". Their insistence on the semantic battle stemmed from this and they were evading the need to reach agreement by insisting on prior implementation, which was not in the Resolution. They seemed to think implementation could come about by a "process of immaculate conception" without any negotiation or firm and binding agreements. Israel had a horror of being caught again as she was in 1957 and he and his country could never forgive themselves if they once again put themselves in a similar position. He hoped you would agree that just as no solid or durable house could be built without adherence to the principles of architecture, so no solid or enduring international accord could be achieved without regard to the principles of international diplomacy and practice which were negotiation and agreement between the parties. He asked that we should remember how the Americans had been caught over the famous Rusk/Dorwin Draft - a classic example of parties signing a document without

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Tel Aviv telegram No. 261 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

fully agreeing on what it meant. Israel's side of the bargain as withdrawal - a step which once taken was non-retractable. Were they really to give up this card against vague statements of non-belligerency which were retractable in 24 hours if Nasser chose to behave as he had done in the past?

5. If the Egyptians refused to come to Rhodes or negotiate it meant that they were not interested in peace. He was not worried if they returned to the Security Council as Israel had a firm case which would receive support from the world. It would not be hard to expose whether it was Egypt or Israel who was refusing to accept the Resolution of 22 November. (Here he spoke as if he thought he had Jarring behind him, since he said that Jarring had accepted that he could not accomplish his Mission unless the two sides sat down and negotiated.)

6. There was one point, however, he would request you to study. Israel had accepted the Rhodes formula. There was a misconception in some quarters that this entailed sitting in separate rooms while Jarring shuttled between. He asked you to look up the record. Only one day had been spent by Bunche in this fashion. After that he had convened the parties in the same room and they had worked out a flexible form of procedure which had been crowned with success. Israel could never accept a Lausanne formula of sitting in separate rooms and never meeting at all: not only because Lausanne had been a failure and undone all the good of Rhodes but because Israel would not accept the implicit degree of ostracism and non-recognition. If the Egyptians had been prepared to meet with Israel in 1949 when Israel was only a provisional government and not even a member of the United Nations they could certainly put up with the degree of recognition entailed in sitting in the same room with a fellow member of the United Nations under United Nations auspices. This did not rule out one or two days of preparation in separate rooms, but he would not go, nor would his Government let him go if the sole purpose of the Egyptians was to evade negotiations and say to their fellow Arabs "We have been faithful to Khartoum - no recognition and no negotiation - we never even met the Israelis".

7. Finally he asked me to let you know he was disturbed at Soviet activities. All reports reaching him showed that the Russians were urging the Arabs to torpedo the Jarring Mission and to return to the Security Council, where the Russians could gain further dividends by attacking the "Western/Jewish Plot" and by being more Arab than the Arabs. The Russians clearly thought a settlement would not be in their interests. It was up to the West to persuade Nasser that if he wanted his territories back the only way was by negotiation. The mere fact that negotiations had started would have a dramatic effect in Israel, would prick the bubble of apparent intransigence of the "hawks" and would bring to the surface the underlying yearning for peace in the Jews who would be prepared to pay a great price for it, rather than remain embedded in their present rather morbid preoccupation with security only.

Foreign Office pass Immediate UK Mission New York 80, Cairo 69 and Washington 77 and Saving to Beirut 121.

Mr. Hadow

[Repeated as Requested]

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PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 7 27 February, 1968

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EJ1/20

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.247 of 27 February,
Repeated for information to Amman, Cairo and UKMIS New York and
Saving to Beirut and Jerusalem.

Your telegram No.304 [sic ? 300] Situation in Jordan.

Mr. Eban is fully engaged today in seeing Mr. Jarring and in defending his position in the Knesset Foreign Affairs debate which he will have to wind up this evening. He was under fire from Hacohen (Labour) the Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee. He can therefore only see me tomorrow.

2. Although I will do my best, I am afraid I can hold out little hope of this approach bringing results. There is already trouble inside the Israel Cabinet on what is interpreted as the Government's weakening in its stand on "direct negotiations" with the Arabs. The return of the new refugees is an even more explosive subject. Indeed, I understand that the Prime Minister for some weeks now has tried to avoid any discussion on refugee policy coming up in the Cabinet since this has always led to angry debate, threats of resignation and so on. The Family Reunion Scheme is once again progressing very satisfactorily, this time without official participation of the Red Cross or the Jordanians and Mr. Eban may well prejudice the smaller operation, since the hawks in the Cabinet would be only too pleased for an opportunity to close down refugee operations altogether. Yigal Allen will certainly use all his influence against any relaxation of the rules and his say will count heavily in view of his position in the new united Labour Party.

3. On balance, I would have advised against raising this particular issue at this time. However, it is clear that the situation in Jordan is so grave that something must be done and an approach to Eban at least gives us the opportunity of spelling out once again the danger Israel faces if King Hussein should go. Despite some of their brave words I think, even the "hawks" would be extremely apprehensive about a Soviet backed and armed Jordanian Régime. Furthermore, if King Hussein should fall, Israel cannot escape attracting to herself a great deal of the blame from international opinion for her errors of both omission and commission. It is therefore to our advantage to point out to the Israelis now that if King Hussein falls they can expect nothing but a considerable diminution in American and British sympathy and support for their case.

Foreign Office please pass Cairo 64, and UKMIS New York 75 and Saving to Beirut 19.

Mr. Hadow

[Repeated as requested]

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IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 286 4 March, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 286 of 4 March, Repeated for information to Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, U.K. Mission New York and Washington.

Your telegram No. 337 (not to New York and Washington): Israel decrees concerning entry and exit.

My immediately following telegrams contain texts in translation of four orders promulgated by Minister of the Interior on 25 February and published in the Official Gazette on 29 February.

2. The first two of these orders make the Allenby Bridge a regular point of entry and departure from Israel. They merely give legal sanction to a situation that has existed for several weeks (see my telegrams Nos. 80 of 19 January and 128 of 31 January). The only additional practical effect of these regulations will be that the border control post at the Bridge will be staffed by civilian instead of military officials.

3. The other two orders exempt persons travelling between Israel and the occupied territories from the normal entry and exit requirements of Israel law. These also regularise an existing practice. The Ministry of the Interior have told us in explanation of these orders that they have no other purpose than to remedy a situation in which all crossings from Israel to the occupied territories and vice versa were technically in breach of existing legislation.

4. My American colleague shares my view that these new orders do not in any way affect the status of the occupied territories as will be seen they contain no mention either of "enemy territory" or of "occupied territory".

5. As so often in the past, the timing was lamentable. The Head of the Legal Department in the Foreign Ministry has told the American Embassy that his Ministry were not consulted on the orders. My Counsellor was given similar information last night by one of the Foreign Ministry's Legal Advisers who also expressed the personal view that the orders relating to the Allenby Bridge fell outside the legislative competence of the Minister of the Interior.

6. Reading between the lines of today's Press comment it looks as though the action of the Ministry of the Interior in promulgating these orders without proper consultation with other Ministries concerned, particularly the Foreign Ministry, sparked off a row in the Cabinet yesterday. It is reported that as a result of this a ruling has been given that any future legislation which might have international repercussions should first be discussed with the Foreign Ministry.

Foreign Office pass Priority to Jerusalem No. 25, Beirut No. 45, Cairo No. 73, U.K. Mission New York No. 84 and Washington No. 81.

Mr. Hadow [Repeated as requested]

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IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 260

28 February, 1968

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 260 of 28 February, Repeated for information to Washington, Amman, Cairo and UKMIS New York and Saving to Beirut and Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 247: Situation in Jordan.

I saw Mr. Eban in Jerusalem today for over an hour. Though looking tired, I have never seen him so self-confident and on top of his form. He obviously felt he had had a good day yesterday in the Knesset and with his opponents in the Cabinet.

2. I spoke according to para. 1, the first sentence of para. 2 and para. 3 of your telegram No. 300 and handed him a piece of paper containing the text of your message.

3. Mr. Eban said that he would accept your diagnosis of the difficulties which King Hussein faced. Jarring had also given him a disturbing account of the atmosphere in Amman but Eban did not take quite such a gloomy view;

(a) of the likelihood of the army deserting King Hussein or

(b) of the importance of the "new refugees" in the support the terrorists now enjoyed in Jordan.

He also accepted that it was not in Israel's interests that the Hashemites should fall. In order to help Jordan therefore the Israelis had recently taken the following steps:-

(a) They had been told by the U.S. Administration that it was quite possible that Israel's supporters in Congress and the Senate could wreck the proposal to supply Jordan with arms and had been asked to help. This they had done with success and had damped down efforts by important people in the United States, whom Eban described as "more Royalist than King". They had also stopped any press campaign either in Israel or by their supporters in America. (My American colleague confirms that the above is correct.)

(b) They had stepped up, with Jarring's concurrence, certain contacts with King Hussein through prominent West Bankers. The aim of these was to persuade King Hussein that the Israelis would be generous in negotiations once these were embarked upon. Mr. Eban begged that the fact that these contacts were taking place should be for your information only.

/(c) They

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Tel Aviv Telno 260 to Foreign Office

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(c) They were again in contact with the Jordanians on the possibility of direct exchanges at a fairly high military level on the frontier situation. The previous misunderstanding when the officer appointed by King Hussein had failed to turn up and had subsequently proved to be undergoing medical treatment in New York had been explained away. It might well be that the Jordanians would prefer to deal with terrorist activities and the frontier situation in this way rather than have U.N. observers (my telegram No. 213).

(d) They were proceeding with the family reunion scheme.

4. When I pressed him that the purport of your message was that something even further should be done for the refugees, he said this was something he would certainly consider, for instance he thought possibility was that the Israelis might see whether the six thousand odd, processed but unused passes issued in August might not be transferred to other persons who really did want to come back. When I asked whether this would go down well with some of his colleagues e.g. Mr. Allon, he replied that the latter believed in first things first and fully supported him on the need to get development schemes going on the West Bank, so that the refugees would be encouraged to come back. At present the tendency in the Arab population, particularly in Gaza was to unite themselves with their relatives and the Arab world by trekking eastward and there was not enough attraction to bring them westward.

5: I then pressed him on the question of the appropriated land in Jerusalem (my telegram No. 246). He said that Jordanian threats of recourse to the Security Council were concerted with the Egyptians so as to bring pressure on the West in connexion with the Jarring Mission. If the Arabs wanted the return of their territories or a say in what happened all they had to do was to negotiate. He would certainly say that once the Jordanians were in negotiation with Israel any activities in Jerusalem which might prejudice the negotiation would be stopped. But it was intolerable that the Jordanians who had seized Jerusalem in war, had destroyed the Jewish Quarter, expelled or killed the Jews, desecrated the large Jewish cemeteries and denied freedom of religion for 20 years, should now try to make an issue of constructive development projects and dictate to Israel from long distance, so to speak, while refusing to discuss or negotiate the future of the city. All that was going on in the appropriated areas was planning and reclamation and he did not think building could be contemplated for some time. If the Jordanians wanted a say in stopping even this going on, let them come forward and negotiate or press Nasser that the only thing that would save Jordan would be for him to agree to negotiate.

P.C. refs Immediate Washington 75, Cairo 64, and UKMIS New York 79,
and Saville to Beirut 20.

[Repeated as requested]

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IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 764

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
2 MARCH 1968

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GUARD.

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 764 OF 2 MARCH
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 300 TO TEL AVIV AND MY TELEGRAM NO. 711
(NOT TO ALL) : MIDDLE EAST.

SINCE I SPOKE TO RUSK ON 26 FEBRUARY I HAVE SEEN GENE ROSTOW
AND ALSO TELEPHONED HIM SEVERAL TIMES ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HAVE
IN ADDITION BEEN PUSHING THIS HARD IN THE BUREAU OF NEAR EAST
AFFAIRS WHOSE VIEWS ARE VERY CLOSE TO YOUR OWN.

2. WE NOW LEARN THAT AS A RESULT MR. RUSK LAST NIGHT APPROVED
THE DESPATCH OF THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO U.S. AMBASSADOR
TEL AVIV:

(I) TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH THE BRITISH APPROACH ABOUT THE
RETURN OF REFUGEES BOTH ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS AND TO RELIEVE
PRESSURE ON JORDAN, RELATING HIS REMARKS SPECIFICALLY TO A
LETTER SENT BY MR. RUSK TO MR. EBAN ON THIS SUBJECT LAST
SEPTEMBER.

(II) TO URGE THE ISRAELIS STRONGLY TO SUSPEND UNILATERAL
ACTIVITIES IN OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, INCLUDING BOTH THE EXPROPRIATION
OF ANY FURTHER LAND AND STOPPING WORK ON LAND ALREADY EXPROPRIATED:

(III) THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IS TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT
/IF,

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IF, IN SPITE OF AMERICAN EFFORTS TO AVERT IT, JERUSALEM SHOULD ONCE AGAIN BE RAISED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE ISRAELIS CANNOT ANY LONGER COUNT ON U.S. SUPPORT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS VEILED THREAT TO THE ISRAELIS IS CLOSELY IN LINE WITH THE VIEWS OF MR. GOLDBERG WHO HAS APPARENTLY BECOME INCREASINGLY ANGRY ABOUT ISRAELI ACTIVITIES IN EAST JERUSALEM.

3. A SUGGESTION HAS ALSO BEEN PUT TO MR. RUSK (AND HE HAS AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE ACTIVELY CONSIDERED) THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FURTHER AMERICAN PUBLIC STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM AND ALSO ON WITHDRAWAL: THE SECTION DEALING WITH WITHDRAWAL WOULD STRESS THAT THE UNITED STATES FULLY SUPPORTS THE INADMISSIBILITY OF CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR.

4. THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN IS DUE TO SEE THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TODAY AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE HOPING THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO BARBOUR WILL BE HELPFUL TO HIM.

5. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS TO BARBOUR IN STRICT CONFIDENCE BY A MEMBER OF THE BUREAU OF NEAR EAST AFFAIRS. I AM TO BE INFORMED OF THEM OFFICIALLY BY BATTLE, PROBABLY ON MONDAY.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV 51, AND AMMAN 50.

SIR P. DEAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]


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